Ecosystem services: The economics debate  by Farley, Joshua
Ecosystem Services 1 (2012) 40–49Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectEcosystem Services2212-04
http://d
n Tel.:
E-mjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecoserEcosystem services: The economics debateJoshua Farley n
Community Development and Applied Economics, Fellow, Gund Institute for Ecological Economics, 205B Morrill Hall, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405, USAa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 April 2012
Received in revised form
3 July 2012
Accepted 5 July 2012







Ecological-economic efﬁciency16& 2012 Elsevier B.V.
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecoser.2012.07.002
þ1 802 656 2989; fax: þ1 802 656 1423.
ail addresses: Joshua.Farley@uvm.edu, jfarley
Open access under CC BY-Na b s t r a c t
The goal of this paper is to illuminate the debate concerning the economics of ecosystem services. The
sustainability debate focuses on whether or not ecosystem services are essential for human welfare and
the existence of ecological thresholds. If ecosystem services are essential, then marginal analysis and
monetary valuation are inappropriate tools in the vicinity of thresholds. The justice debate focuses on
who is entitled to ecosystem services and the ecosystem structure that generates them. Answers to
these questions have profound implications for the choice of suitable economic institutions. The
efﬁciency debate concerns both the goals of economic activity and the mechanisms best suited to
achieve those goals. Conventional economists pursue Pareto efﬁciency and the maximization of
monetary value, achieved by integrating ecosystem services into the market framework. Ecological
economists and many others pursue the less rigorously deﬁned goal of achieving the highest possible
quality of life compatible with the conservation of resilient, healthy ecosystems, achieved by adapting
economic institutions to the physical characteristics of ecosystem services. The concept of ecosystem
services is a valuable tool for economic analysis, and should not be discarded because of disagreements
with particular economists’ assumptions regarding sustainability, justice and efﬁciency.
& 2012 Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
One of the most basic laws of physics is that it is impossible to
create something from nothing. All economic products result
from the transformation of raw materials provided by nature.
Furthermore, it is impossible to create nothing from something.
All human-made products eventually break down, wear out and
fall apart, returning to the ecosystem as waste (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971). The extraction of raw materials from nature and
the return of disordered waste are known as throughput (Daly,
1977). We also know from physics that the transformation of raw
material inputs into economic products and waste requires low
entropy energy, irreversibly converted through use into high
entropy waste. Finite stocks of fossil fuels account for nearly
90% of all energy used for economic production (International
Energy Agency, 2011), creating steady ﬂows of carbon dioxide and
other pollutants into the atmosphere. Society controls the rate at
which fossil fuels are extracted, and hence the ﬂow of waste into
the ecosystem from their combustion.
Many of the raw materials physically transformed into eco-
nomic products (e.g. plants, animals, water, minerals and so on)
alternatively serve as the structural building blocks of ecosys-
tems. Like fossil fuels, society can largely determine how fast to.uvm@gmail.com
C-ND license. deplete available stocks. For example, we can clear cut a million-
tree forest in one year, or harvest 100,000 trees a year for
10 years. This means that we can stockpile ecosystem structure.
If we refrain from cutting down trees for a decade, we have more
trees available at the end of the decade.
A healthy ecosystem emerges from a particular conﬁguration
of ecosystem structure. Ecosystems function as a fund capable of
generating a ﬂux of ecosystem services over time. Ecosystems are
not physically transformed into the services they generate,
society has little control over the rate at which a fund generates
services, and services cannot be stockpiled. For example, a forest
is not physically transformed when it puriﬁes water and regulates
ﬂooding. A given forest can purify or regulate only a limited
amount of water per period of time. If there is no rainfall for a
month or if humans refrain from using water puriﬁcation and
ﬂood regulation for a month, more services are not available at
the end of the month (Malghan, 2011). Note that much of the
literature treats many provisioning services as a stock of raw
materials (Fisher et al. 2008; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,
2005). By the deﬁnition proposed here, however, provisioning
services are the reproductive capacity of ecosystems. Plants and
animals are only capable of reproducing at a given rate over time,
are not physically transformed into their offspring (except for the
material in the seed, egg, or newborn), and reproductive capacity
cannot be stockpiled (Farley and Costanza, 2010).
When ecosystem structure is converted into economic pro-
ducts and the resulting waste returned to the ecosystem, often in
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adapt, ecosystem services are affected. Economic production
unavoidably affects the provision of ecosystem services.
Economics is frequently deﬁned as ‘‘the study of the allocation
of limited, or scarce, resources among alternative, competing
ends’’ (Daly and Farley, 2010, p. 3). This deﬁnition does not
presuppose market mechanisms. One of the central challenges
in economics is to determine how much ecosystem structure
should be converted into economic products, and how much left
intact to generate ecosystem services. Before society can decide
how to answer this question, however, it must prioritize the
desirable ends, and must also have a ﬁrm understanding of the
nature of the scarce resources.
These three issues — the desirable ends of economic activity;
the nature of ecosystem services and particular conﬁguration of
ecosystem structure that gives rise to them; and the question of
how to allocate — have given rise to a number of important
debates on the economics of ecosystem services. The goal of this
article is to illuminate these debates. The article is organized
around three desirable ends that are taken as axiomatic: sustain-
ability, justice and efﬁciency.
Desirable ends are ultimately normative value judgments.
Sustainability assumes that we have ethical obligations to future
generations. Certainly few people would argue that we have no
such obligations, or that sustainability is not a high-order desir-
able end. Philosopher John Rawls argued that ‘‘Justice is the ﬁrst
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought’’
(Rawls, 1999, p. 3). Increasing evidence suggests that people have
an innate concern for justice and fairness, and that high levels of
inequality strongly correlate with a range of health and social
problems (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Furthermore, it is difﬁ-
cult to defend justice towards unborn future generations (i.e.
sustainability) without concern for justice towards the current
generation. While there is considerable debate about what con-
stitutes justice, few would argue that justice is not important.
Finally, given ﬁnite resources and unmet needs, it is important to
use resources efﬁciently to satisfy both needs and wants. Virtually
all economists accept the importance of efﬁcient allocation.
Sections 2–4 will describe the debates surrounding these goals,
followed by some brief conclusions.2. Sustainability
Sustainability has two central components. First is ecological
sustainability, loosely deﬁned here as the capacity of ecosystems
to remain diverse, resilient and productive over time, and to
maintain the ﬂow of ecosystem services essential for humans and
other species. We must of course recognize that ecosystems,
including their human components, are inherently complex,
adaptive, and continually evolving systems (Liu et al., 2007). It
is highly unlikely that human activity could destroy planetary
ecosystems in any meaningful sense, but it could lead to dramatic
reconﬁgurations that lead them to ﬂip into alternate states.
A related component is economic sustainability, loosely
deﬁned as the capacity of an economic system — at any scale
from individual households to the global economy — to remain
diverse, resilient and productive over time. Some ecosystem
services are essential to human welfare, and their loss could have
unacceptable economic impacts. For example, agriculture and
civilization evolved during the Holocene, a geographic era char-
acterized by an unusually stable climate. We have now entered
the Anthropocene, an era in which the impacts of human
activities on ecosystems are on the scale of geological forces
(Crutzen, 2002). Anthropogenic climate change is a threat to both
ecological and economic sustainability (Battisti and Naylor, 2009;IPCC, 2007a), but the loss of other ecosystem services may pose
dire threats to the economy without threatening a dramatic
reconﬁguration of global ecosystems. For example, drugs used
on sick cattle that are lethal to the vultures threaten India and
Europe’s vultures with extinction (Lemus and Blanco, 2009;
Profﬁtt and Bagla, 2004). Vultures’ consumption of carrion is an
important disease regulation service (Markandya et al., 2008), and
their elimination could hypothetically result in a catastrophic
global pandemic that fundamentally disrupts human civilization
with otherwise relatively minor impacts on global ecosystems.
Alternatively, individual households or small communities may
depend on local ecosystem services such as water puriﬁcation,
disturbance regulation, or pollination. Ecosystems may be dis-
rupted in such a way that the generation of these speciﬁc services
is disrupted for long enough to destroy the economies that
depend on them, even if the ecosystem itself remains resilient
and eventually recovers.
There are at least three closely related central debates con-
cerning the relationship between economics, ecosystem services
and sustainability. The ﬁrst is whether or not some ecosystem
services are essential to human welfare and have no substitutes
on the scale required to sustain civilization in their absence. This
is known as the strong vs. weak sustainability debate (Ekins et al.,
2003b; Neumayer, 2003). The second is over the existence of
ecological thresholds, beyond which positive feedback loops will
lead ecosystems to ﬂip into alternative states potentially far less
conduce to human welfare, and how close we might be to such
thresholds (Meadows, 2008; Muradian, 2001). These thresholds
present limits to marginal analysis, the dominant tool of conven-
tional economics (Farley, 2008b). The third debate is whether or
not ecosystem services impose limitations on endless economic
production, either because we must conserve enough ecosystem
structure to sustain them, which reduces the amount available for
conversion to economic products, or else because losing critical
ecosystem services will result in an end to growth (Daly, 2007;
Meadows et al., 2004).
2.1. Strong vs. weak sustainability
Probably the most widely cited description of sustainable
development is ‘‘development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs’’ (Brundtland et al., 1987). This is widely inter-
preted by economists as the need to leave the future no less
capital (deﬁned as a stock that provides a ﬂow of beneﬁts over
time) per person than the current generation enjoys.
Proponents of weak sustainability believe that natural capital
(the goods and services provided by nature) and human made
capital (including built, human and social capital) are substitutes.
The current generation can leave the future any combination of
different capitals as long as the total value of the capital passed on
is non-declining (Pearce and Turner, 1990). As a result, many
economists believe that natural resources play a negligible role in
economic output (Dasgupta, 2008). From this perspective, all
resources have substitutes. Schelling, the winner of the Nobel
Memorial Prize in economics, argues that ‘‘agriculture and for-
estry are less than 3% of the total output, and little else is much
affected [by climate change]. Even if agricultural productivity
declined by a third over the next half century, the per capita GNP
we might have achieved by 2050 we would still achieve in 2051’’
(Schelling, 2007). Even food is substitutable.
Proponents of strong sustainability in contrast believe that
natural capital and human made capital are rarely substitutes and
often complements. Ecosystem services are essential to the
survival of humans and all other species. No amount of human
made capital can fully replace them (Costanza et al., 1991;
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stocks that generate essential ecosystem services are known as
critical natural capital (CNC) (Ekins et al., 2003a). We do not
however always know what elements of natural capital are
critical, and what elements can be lost without seriously reducing
human welfare (Farley, 2008b). Aldo Leopold argued that we
should in fact treat all natural capital as critical: ‘‘If the biota, in
the course of aeons, has built something we like but do not
understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless
parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the ﬁrst precaution of
intelligent tinkering.’’ (Leopold, 1993, pp. 145–146). If this is true,
then the debate over whether we should adopt an anthropo-
centric or biocentric world view is moot: humans depend on the
deeply interconnected web of biodiversity for their own survival,
and we must protect other species to protect ourselves.
If strong sustainability holds, two basic rules apply. First,
humans cannot degrade or deplete any element of ecosystem
structure (e.g. ﬁsh, forests, or fresh water) faster than it can
restore itself without eventually crossing some threshold beyond
which that component of the structure is gone (e.g. a tree species
goes extinct), or else the ecosystem as a whole crosses an
irreversible threshold (e.g. the forest losses the capacity to
regenerate). As a corollary to this rule, enough structure must
be left intact to maintain the ﬂux of ecosystem services upon
which humans depend. Second, humans cannot emit waste into
any ﬁnite system at rates greater than it is absorbed, or else waste
stocks will accumulate, causing increasing harm to humans and
the ecosystem. Unfortunately, economists’ and decision-makers’
failure to acknowledge the importance of natural resources has
led us past these limits (Daly, 1990). It is now essential to reduce
resource extraction below regeneration rates and waste emissions
below absorption rates until stocks are restored to levels compa-
tible with ecological and economic sustainability.
2.2. Marginal analysis and thresholds
Another important debate concerns the existence of ecological
and economic thresholds, and hence the limits of marginal
analysis. Conventional economic analysis is based on the evalua-
tion of very small (marginal) changes in economic costs and
beneﬁts. Complex systems, including coupled human–natural
systems, are characterized by high levels of non-linearity, emer-
gent phenomena and surprises (Liu et al., 2007). A threshold, or
phase transition, is a sharp boundary that delimits qualitatively
different conﬁgurations of a system. When a system crosses a
threshold, a very small change in economic activity can have
enormous impacts. Crossing such thresholds can lead to the
irreversible loss of critical natural capital (CNC), with unaccep-
table costs to society (Meadows, 2008). In the vicinity of thresh-
olds, marginal analysis is inappropriate (Farley, 2008b).
There is overwhelming theoretical and empirical support for
the existence of ecological and biological thresholds. Phase
transitions in mathematical or computer models of dynamic
complex systems are very common. Such systems may ﬂuctuate
around an attractor, a set of qualitatively similar conﬁgurations.
Small perturbations may lead the system away from the attractor,
but when they are removed, it returns. A large enough perturba-
tion however can lead the system away from one attractor basin
and towards another that is qualitatively different (Kauffman,
1995; Meadows, 2008).
Potentially critical global ecological thresholds include climate
change, biodiversity loss, deforestation and so on. As long as green
house gasses are emitted into the atmosphere faster than they can
be absorbed by ecosystems, atmospheric stocks will accumulate,
likely exacerbating climate change. A threshold in this case might
be caused by positive feedback loops, when reduced albedo frommelting ice or increased methane emissions from thawing tundra
leads to additional warming that causes more ice melt and
methane release. At this point, even eliminating anthropogenic
emissions may fail to reverse the positive feedback loop, and the
climate may move towards a different conﬁguration that is less
suitable for agriculture and hence human civilization (IPCC,
2007b).
Speciﬁc ecosystems may also confront thresholds. The Amazon
forest currently recycles an estimated 50% of its rainfall when rain
evaporates from trees or evapotranspiration transfers soil moist-
ure into the air. When enough tree cover is removed, rain may
strike bare ground and ﬂow rapidly into the rivers, where it is
ﬂushed from the system forever. Eventually, there may be too
little rainfall to sustain the forest, leading to further depletion by
drought and ﬁre, and greater drying. Brazil’s Atlantic forest is 93%
deforested, and it may already have passed a critical ecological
threshold. Biologists and ecologists expect a signiﬁcant decline in
biodiversity that will work itself out over decades to centuries,
with potentially profound impacts on the ability of the ecosystem
to reproduce itself. The loss of forest may also lead to drying out
of the climate and increasing forest ﬁres that threaten forest
remnants (Farley, 2008a).
Individual species confront thresholds in terms of minimum
viable populations. For example, passenger pigeons, once the
most abundant bird species on the planet, depended on huge
colonies for successful reproduction. Once colonies fell below
some critical size, their natural mortality rates might have
exceeded their reproduction rates even if hunting and habitat
destruction had halted, leading to their inevitable extinction
(Firth and Blockstein, no date). The loss of keystone species may
lead to a cascade of extinctions (Curtsdotter et al., 2011), and the
loss of enough critical species could potentially lead to a major
extinction event.
It may be impossible to know ahead of time exactly where an
ecological threshold lays, what will be the implications of cross-
ing it, and how long it will take for those implications to reveal
themselves. We do not know what level of climate change will
lead to runway feedback loops, what new climate equilibrium
might emerge, and when it will be reached. No one predicted
ahead of time that passenger pigeons would go extinct. Scientists
now think that passenger pigeons may have provided important
disease regulation services. The lack of competition for acorns
from passenger pigeons may have led to a surge in mouse and
deer populations, in the tick populations that fed on these
mammals, and in the spirochete populations hosted by the ticks,
resulting in an epidemic of Lyme disease 100 years after the
extinction of the bird (Blockstein, 1998). This uncertainty makes it
difﬁcult to determine when marginal analysis ceases to be
appropriate.
Relevant economic thresholds can be treated as physiological
thresholds, the failure to satisfy basic needs. They occur when the
economic unit — from household to global economy — cannot
reproduce or even maintain itself, resulting in death or collapse.
Economic thresholds are affected by ecosystem services asso-
ciated with food provision, water provision and puriﬁcation,
disease regulation and disturbance regulation, among others.
The economy may cross a critical threshold, even if the ecosystem
itself does not: an extensive drought could destroy a civilization
without otherwise doing irreversible damage to an ecosystem. As
is the case with ecosystems, humans are resilient. We can fall
below the minimum number of calories to sustain life for a long
time and recover when more calories become available. However,
living close to thresholds can make us highly susceptible to
exogenous shocks, such as disease.
In economics, supply and demand curves are based on mar-
ginal analysis. A supply curve is a graphical depiction of marginal
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and costs are respectively positive and negative values. Value is
typically measured in terms of opportunity costs, or trade-offs:
what must be sacriﬁced when the quantity of CNC declines by one
unit? Economists deﬁne a resource as abundant when there is
enough for all desired uses, and hence no competition for use.
Probably few ecosystems enjoy this status. When ecosystems are
far from ecological or biological thresholds, ecosystem structure
can be allocated towards relatively unimportant beneﬁts. As the
stock of CNC declines, however, we must forgo increasingly
important beneﬁts, including resilience, the ability of the system
or human populations to recover from exogenous shocks (e.g. a
drought that reduces food production or ecosystem regeneration).
As the system nears ecological or biological thresholds, its
marginal value will climb rapidly. A small percentage drop in
quantity leads to a large percentage increase in marginal value.
On the border of the threshold (which is unknown and potentially
unknowable in advance) a marginal loss of ecosystem structure
can lead to the loss of life sustaining beneﬁts, or of the ability of
the ecosystem to restore itself. We have left the domain of
marginal value, and moved into the domain of total value, which
is perhaps best illustrated by the diamond–water paradox. Dia-
monds have a high marginal value because they are scarce, but
the world would suffer little if they disappeared. Total value is
low. Water has a low marginal value because (in many parts of
the world) it is not very scarce, but if it disappeared even for one
week, we would quickly realize that its total value is inﬁnite.
Fig. 1 depicts a demand curve for CNC measured in terms of
physiological or ecological values.
This analysis of course assumes the existence of CNC. Marginal
values only rise precipitously for resources that are essential and
non-substitutable. Demand for such resources is said to be
inelastic. Demand becomes perfectly inelastic at the biological
or ecological threshold, when access to an additional unit of the
resource is essential for survival. If in contrast we can ﬁnd a
limitless substitute for any type of natural capital, known in
economic jargon as a back-stop technology (Dasgupta and Heal,
1979), its marginal value cannot exceed the price of the sub-
stitute, and marginal analysis remains appropriate.
2.3. Limits to physical growth
The third sustainability debate centers on limits to growth. If
the economy is a physical system, then economic production
must remove resources from nature and return waste. Continuous
exponential growth of any physical sub-system of a ﬁnite system
is impossible. As Kenneth Boulding reputedly stated, ‘‘anyoneFig. 1. The ecological/physiological demand curve for critical natural capital.who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a ﬁnite
world is either a madman or an economist.’’ The strong sustain-
ability paradigm, the existence of ecological and biological
thresholds, and our high levels of ignorance suggest that we
may reach and even surpass limits without realizing it. Many
scientists believe we have already crossed critical thresholds, and
have a narrow window of opportunity to engage in extensive
restoration before it is too late. Critics of the belief in limits to
growth generally argue that Malthus has been disproven, and
new technologies will overcome all resource constraints
(Diamandis and Kotler, 2012; Simon, 1996). Perhaps the central
debate concerns the burden of proof: should we pursue growth
until we have proof that it leads to ecological and economic
collapse, or should we conserve nature until we have proof of
technological substitutes at the necessary scale?
A limit to physical economic growth does not necessarily
imply a limit to improvements in human welfare or quality of
life, which is generated by the fulﬁllment of a variety of different
human needs (Costanza et al., 2007). However, a singular focus on
economic growth may come at the expense of fulﬁlling other
human needs that would make a greater contribution to quality
of life.3. Justice
Distributive justice — the proper allocation of resources
among groups and individuals — is particularly important in
economics. In the case of ecosystems services, justice concerns
entitlements to both the structural building blocks of ecosystems
and the services they generate. The two of course are frequently
in conﬂict. If one individual has the right to the timber in a forest,
this may conﬂict with the right of another individual to enjoy the
water puriﬁcation, ﬂood regulation, climate regulation and other
services provided by that forest. The economic debate in ecosys-
tem services focuses largely on how to reconcile this conﬂict.3.1. Biological demand and utility maximization
There is a long history in economics, emerging from utilitar-
ianism, of a consequentialist approach to justice: distributive
justice is determined by whatever generates the best outcome
for society (Mill, 1871).
Measured in physiological terms as discussed in Section 2.2,
CNC is likely to be much more valuable to the poor than to the
rich, especially at the local level. When a stock of CNC passes a
threshold locally, substitutes from other areas may still be
available. For example, if the ecosystem is no longer capable of
providing food and water, or of regulating diseases, it is possible
to bring in food and water from other regions (or purify water by
ﬁltration or boiling) and purchase medicines against disease. If
eroded barrier islands and damaged wetlands no longer offer
adequate protection against storm surges and hurricanes, it is
possible to build more fortiﬁed and elevated buildings, or to ﬂee
an advancing storm and relocate to a different area. However,
such substitutes require purchasing power, and are likely to be
more available to the rich than the poor. They may in fact be
completely inaccessible to the poor, as we saw in the case of
Hurricane Katrina, when the rich ﬂed the city while many poor
(by US standards) suffered and died. Fig. 2 depicts differing
biological demand curves for local CNC for the rich and the poor.
Many local ecosystem services are not in fact invaluable to the
rich, and hence not critical. Their maximum marginal value is
limited by the existence of adequate substitutes, so called back-
stop technologies.
Fig. 2. The demand for local critical natural capital for the rich and for the poor.
Fig. 3. The market demand curve for CNC in an economy characterized by an
unequal distribution of purchasing power.
1 A 60 lb. bushel of wheat sold for $7.79 in March, 2012 (http://www.
indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=wheat), or a bit over $0.10/lb.
According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, a 1 lb loaf of whole wheat bread
averaged $2.044 in February, 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/ro3/apmw.htm).
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relevant to ecosystem services should give greater weight to the
preferences of those who depend the most upon them, which will
generally be the poor, who cannot afford substitutes.
3.2. Shared inheritance and equal rights for all
Economists also frequently argue for the notion of just deserts:
we are entitled to what we produce with our own labor, capital,
and entrepreneurial ability. However, ecosystem services and
ecosystem structure were not produced by human effort, but
are rather our shared inheritance from nature, to which everyone
is entitled an equal share (Barnes, 2006). In the case of ecosystem
services that cannot be privately owned, this would translate into
an equal say for all in allocation decisions concerning ecosystem
services. This implies a democratic decision making process.
Note that conventional economists typically treat the loss of
ecosystem services as a negative externality of the use of
ecosystem structure and resulting waste emissions. A negative
externality occurs when an action by one party causes an
unintended loss in welfare to another party, and no compensation
occurs. If decisions concerning economic activities are made
democratically by all those who beneﬁt from the ecosystem
services affected by the decision, by deﬁnition there can be no
externalities. For example, society could cap the conversion of
ecosystem structure then auction off use rights to individuals,
with resulting revenue dedicated to the common good. The
associated loss of ecosystem services would also affect society
as a whole, which would therefore naturally strive to balance
costs with beneﬁts.
3.3. Market demand and willingness to pay
Finally, economists frequently take a property rights approach
to distributive justice, arguing that whatever distribution emerges
from voluntary transactions (e.g. market transactions) is just. The
initial distribution of wealth, power and resources prior to the
voluntary market transactions is typically considered the domain
of other disciplines or other social institutions (e.g. the political
system) or else assumed to be just. This is perhaps the most
prevalent economic perspective.
There are two ways this plays out in practice: the monetary
valuation of ecosystem services based on estimates of willingness
to pay (e.g. through contingent valuation, hedonic pricing, travel
cost, etc.) and the use of market based instruments for allocation
decisions concerning ecosystem services. Both approaches arebased on market demand curves, estimated or actual. Market
demand is determined by preferences weighted by purchasing
power. The preferences of the wealthy are weighted heavily, and
the preferences of the destitute are virtually ignored. The
willingness to pay approach is virtually the opposite of the
consequentialist approach. To reconcile the two, one must
assume either that it is impossible to compare utility between
different individuals (discussed below), or that poor people are
inconsequential.
Fig. 3 depicts a market demand curve for CNC. It looks the
same as the ecological/physiological demand curve depicted in
Fig. 1, but the story behind it is somewhat different. The
ecological/physiological demand curve is based on objective
physiological or ecological necessities. As the supply of critical
ecosystem services diminishes, people stop allocating the
resources towards less important wants in order to meet critical
needs, driving marginal values steeply upwards. A market
demand curve in contrast is inherently subjective because it
depends on purchasing power. As the quantity of CNC diminishes,
physiological demand remains the same for rich and poor, but the
rich outbid the poor for access to the diminished resources. When
inequality is high, satisfaction of minor wants for the rich take
precedence over basic necessities for the poor. In other words,
market economies characterized by high levels of inequality stop
allocating CNC towards the people it implicitly deems least
important, the poor.
Examples of the market approach of course abound, for
marketed as well as non-marketed ecosystem services. Grain
prices doubled to tripled between 2006 and 2007 in response to
an increase in demand for biofuels, a small decrease in supply,
and speculation. Another bubble is predicted in 2013 (Lagi et al.,
2012). Most people in wealthy nations hardly noticed. Wholesale
wheat prices account for perhaps $0.10 in a $2.00 loaf of bread,1
and food expenditures account for less than 15% of income. When
grain prices triple, food costs in a wealthy nation might increase
by 10%, which is less than 2% of income. Demand is almost
unaffected. For poor people in poor countries, grains account for a
much higher share of domestic food purchases, and food expen-
ditures can account for 50% of income. Tripling grain prices might
double food costs. As a result, wealthy societies continue to waste
large quantities of grain (Gustavsson et al., 2011) at the same time
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the poor (AAH, 2009).
While society largely accepts this approach to distribution for
market goods and services, it does not automatically follow that
we should take the same approach for the distribution of
ecosystem services. The inhabitants of the best-preserved ecosys-
tems that generate the most important services are frequently not
part of the market economy, and rely on alternative economic
institutions with different concepts of value. Justice also concerns
the distribution of power, and we must question the right of
market nations to impose their deﬁnition of value on other
cultures.
A property rights approach also raises serious issues because
property rights to ecosystem services rarely exist, and in many
cases it would be impossible to create individual property rights,
particularly for regulating services.4. Efﬁciency
Given ﬁnite resources and unmet needs, efﬁciency is a central
issue in economics. In general, efﬁciency implies maximizing
some desired output (e.g. quality of life, monetary value) obtain-
able from the available inputs required to produce it (e.g. natural
capital, labor, energy, etc.), or minimizing the costs required to
achieve a desired goal. Economic institutions can be evaluated by
how efﬁciently they allocate resources. However, there are
different types of allocation problems, and economic institutions
that allocate resources efﬁciently (however deﬁned) for one type
of problem may be inefﬁcient for another type of problem.
Speciﬁc deﬁnitions of efﬁciency, often based on speciﬁc deﬁni-
tions of value, can therefore lead to dramatically different policy
recommendations.
This article addresses two types of efﬁciency and two types of
allocation. Pareto efﬁciency is deﬁned as a situation in which no
other allocation of resources could make at least one individual
better off without making anyone else worse off, where ‘better
off’ and ‘worse off’ are deﬁned explicitly in terms of monetary
value. The other type of efﬁciency is less rigorously deﬁned, but
focuses on the greatest level of quality of life that can be achieved
while restoring the damaged ‘‘cogs and wheels’’ of the global
ecosystem, and hence is dubbed here ecological economic efﬁ-
ciency (EEE). As described in the introduction, we confront a
macro-level allocation problem focused on the apportionment of
ecosystem structure between economic products and ecosystem
services. We also face a micro-level allocation problem that
concerns the apportionment of natural resources, labor and
capital among different market products, and those products
among different consumers.4.1. Pareto efﬁciency, monetary value and the commodiﬁcation
of nature
Conventional economists focus primarily on Pareto efﬁciency
and micro-allocation. Under a number of restrictive assumptions
about human behavior, resource characteristics, and existing
institutions, it can be shown mathematically that voluntary
exchange in free markets is Pareto efﬁcient. Subject to the
existing distribution of purchasing power, a Pareto efﬁcient
allocation maximizes economic surplus, a monetary measure of
net beneﬁts to consumers and producers. Free markets achieve
this through the price mechanism, which allocates raw materials
towards those ﬁrms and industries willing to pay the most for
them, maximizing monetary value on the production side; it then
allocates market goods and services towards those consumerswilling to pay the most, maximizing monetary value on the
consumption side.
For the price mechanism to function, all factors of production
and all economic products must be market commodities. How-
ever, many ecosystem services are non-excludable, which means
that one person or group cannot use the resource while prevent-
ing others from doing so. Since use of a non-excludable resource
cannot be made contingent upon payment, no one is likely to pay
for the resource, nor factor the social costs of using the
resource into their decisions. Decisions regarding non-excludable
resources are external to market logic, and impacts on them
are referred to as externalities. For non-excludable resources
that are also rival (i.e. depleted through use) or degraded by
excessive throughput, the typical result is unsustainable overuse;
unjust distribution based on ﬁrst come, ﬁrst served; and inefﬁ-
cient exploitation that fails to maximize monetary value. This
dynamic is in fact largely responsible for the global loss of the
ecosystem structure that generates ecosystem services, and
for excessive waste emissions, including greenhouse gasses
(Hardin, 1968).
Most market economists believe that ecosystem services and
the ecosystem structure that generates them should be integrated
into the market system in order to achieve Pareto efﬁcient
outcomes. This requires that they be treated as market commod-
ities, either by estimating their monetary value and including that
signal in market prices or decisions, or else by making the
resources excludable commodities subject to market allocation.
The principles that guide micro-allocation can then be used to
solve the macro-allocation problem as well.4.1.1. Monetary valuation of non-excludable resources as an
approach to commodiﬁcation
There are numerous methods for estimating the monetary
value of ecosystem services, which have been discussed so
extensively in the literature that there is no need to describe
here either the methods or the extensive debate over their
replicability and accuracy (e.g. Costanza et al., 1997a; Daily and
Ellison, 2002; Michael Getzner et al., 2005; Pearce and Turner,
1990). Most monetary valuation efforts however implicitly take
sides in the sustainability and justice debates described in
Sections 2 and 3. First, valuation implies either weak sustain-
ability or a safe distance from ecological thresholds. The fact that
monetary values are exchange values certainly implies some
degree of substitutability or non-essentiality. If strong sustain-
ability holds true and the ecosystem service in question is near an
ecological threshold — and a growing number of studies suggest
that many ecosystem services, ranging from climate regulation to
ﬁsheries production, are indeed in a critical state (IPCC, 2007c;
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Rockstrom et al., 2009;
Worm et al., 2006) — then demand will be highly inelastic, and
we would expect large changes in monetary value in response to
small changes in quantity. Even when systems appear relatively
far from threshold, the accumulative impact of thousands of
isolated and decentralized marginal decisions to extract more
resource or emit more waste quickly add up to non-marginal
changes, and can rapidly bring a system to steeper part of the
demand curve. Any claims for the efﬁciency of including mone-
tary values into market decisions must account for the costs of
continually re-estimating the change in value and adjusting the
relevant policies. If the system has already passed an ecological
threshold or is likely to do so, then the value of the ecosystem
service would be immeasurably high, and could not be integrated
into price signals. Second, valuation implies the property rights
approach to justice, as most valuation methods are based on
willingness to pay.
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Another approach to the commodiﬁcation of nature is based
on the Coase Theorem. Economist Ronald Coase argued that in the
presence of well-deﬁned property rights and zero transaction
costs, voluntary bargaining could efﬁciently solve the externality
problem without government intervention. Furthermore, the
results would be the same regardless of the initial assignment
of property rights, unless there are wealth effects that would
prevent one actor from compensating the other for harm done or
rewarding the other for beneﬁts received (Ronald, 1960).
For some currently non-excludable ecosystem services, such as
waste absorption capacity, it is possible to create public or private
property rights that make them excludable by regulating access.
Many critical ecosystem services ranging from climate regulation
to disturbance regulation are inherently non-excludable: if the
service exists, it is impossible to prevent those in the service shed
(i.e. the geographical area affected by the service) from beneﬁt-
ting. However, even non-excludable services ﬂow from a parti-
cular conﬁguration of ecosystem structure, and it is generally
possible to create some form of excludable property rights to that
structure (Farley, 2010). Several market-like instruments rely on
this approach.
Payments for ecosystem service (PES) schemes assume that
landowners have the right to degrade ecosystem services, in
which case beneﬁciaries must pay them for switching to land
uses that provide ecosystem services or halt their degradation
(Engel et al., 2008; Wunder, 2005). When the service provided is
itself excludable, market forces determine both price and quantity
through the interaction of supply and demand. However, in many
cases the services generated are inherently non-excludable, and
theoretically only a collective institution representing all bene-
ﬁciaries will be willing to pay for the Pareto efﬁcient level of
services. When the beneﬁt sheds correspond to political bound-
aries, governments can and do play this role, but in many cases
there are no collective institutions at the appropriate scale.
Even within the commodiﬁcation model, there are too many
major debates concerning PES to cover in detail, but several
deserve mention. One is whether or not the transactions costs
of creating, monitoring and enforcing payment schemes are so
high that they outweigh the gains from market solutions. Coase
himself believed this would frequently be the case, noting that
‘‘[t]he world of zero transaction costs has often been described as
a Coasian world. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is the
world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to
persuade the economists to leave’’ (Coase, 1988, p. 174). Due to
the number of providers, the number of beneﬁciaries and their
public good nature, the provision of ecosystem services is likely to
confront high transactions costs regardless of the mechanisms
used, but we cannot a priori assume that markets will have lower
transaction costs and greater efﬁciency than government regula-
tion. Another is whether market payments, known as extrinsic
incentives, will crowd out a landowner’s intrinsic incentive to
provide ecosystem services for the public good. Numerous studies
suggest that inadequate payments could even result in reduced
provision of the services (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Vatn,
2010). A third is whether PES schemes actually achieve their goals
(Muradian et al., 2010; Porras et al., 2008; Sierra and Russman,
2006; Vatn, 2010; Wunder et al., 2008).
In another property rights approach known as cap and trade,
the government places quantitative caps on the ecosystem
structure that generates ecosystems services, or directly on
ecosystem services. Property rights or temporary use rights can
then be distributed to individual corporations (as was done for
carbon emissions in the European Union Emission Trading
Scheme (EU-ETS) (Cl o, 2010) and the US cap and trade program
for SOx (Napolitano et al., 2007)) or auctioned off (as is done bystates in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI Inc.,
2011)). Carbon offset schemes that frequently accompany cap
and trade allow polluters to pay for carbon offsets elsewhere.
When these offsets are in the form of carbon sequestration by
ecosystems, they are examples of PES.
A third approach that implies public property rights is taxes on
throughput, which can be considered a fee for the use of publicly
owned waste absorption capacity or natural resources.
In the case of cap and trade, the government determines
supply, and market demand determines price. In the case of
taxes, governments determine price, and market demand deter-
mines supply. For every cap on supply, there is an equivalent tax
that would lead to the same outcome, though with potentially
different distributional outcomes unless the cap is auctioned off.
Theoretically, a tax equivalent to the marginal external costs of
the taxed activity, or a cap that leads permits to trade at this price,
is Pareto efﬁcient. In reality, both caps and taxes are typically a
compromise between political feasibility, revenue needs, and
ecological concerns, in which case they are cost effective but
not necessarily efﬁcient. There is a signiﬁcant debate in the
economics literature about the relative advantages of the two
approaches; Kahn and Franceschi (2006) provide a good overview
of the case for taxation, while Daly and Farley (2010) do the same
for cap and trade.
In summary, advocates of Pareto efﬁciency generally believe
that placing the correct monetary values on nature and incorpor-
ating these into economic decisions will lead to the optimal
allocation of ecosystem structure between economic production
and ecosystem services. The issue of just distribution is best left
to policy makers, but has little relevance to efﬁciency, and
efﬁcient allocation will ensure the greatest possible wealth
available for distribution. Efﬁciency is the dominant goal of
economic activity, and takes priority over sustainability and
distribution.
4.2. Ecological-economic efﬁciency, incommensurable values
and macro-allocation
The debates between the proponents of Pareto efﬁciency and
proponents of ecological-economic efﬁciency (EEE) are far more
substantial than those within the Pareto efﬁciency approach. EEE
also takes sides in the sustainability and efﬁciency debates
discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Proponents of EEE favor preserving
and restoring every ‘‘cog and wheel’’ because natural capital and
the services it generates are essential to sustaining human
welfare with only limited possibilities for substitution at the
margin (i.e. strong sustainability), and/or because nature has
intrinsic value independent of human preferences. While it can
be difﬁcult to deﬁne quality of life precisely, failure to meet basic
biophysical needs leads to an unacceptable quality of life, and a
given increment of goods and services (ecological or economic) is
likely improve quality of life more when allocated to those who
currently have the least. Maximizing quality of life therefore rules
out the property rights view of justice. Any system that weights
preferences by purchasing power will in general allocate
resources towards the wealthiest individuals, who will gain the
least value measured in terms of biological needs or quality of life.
In other words, Pareto efﬁciency is very inefﬁcient from the EEE
perspective. In fact, to reconcile the consequentialist approach to
justice out of which modern economics emerged (Mill, 1871) with
the property rights approach, economists were forced to assume
that we cannot meaningfully compare welfare between indivi-
duals. For example, if a region loses the ecosystem service of
water puriﬁcation, we cannot assume the change in welfare for a
rich person forced to drink bottled water is less than that of a
destitute mother forced to watch her children die of dysentery.
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cannot all be measured with the same yardstick. Converting these
diverse elements to monetary values simply masks the under-
lying ethical choices and difﬁcult decisions about tradeoffs
between ecological resilience, human life and health, species loss,
obligations towards future generations and so on (Ackerman and
Heinzerling, 2004). In a complex system with uncertain facts, high
stakes, urgent decisions and competing ethical values, there is no
such thing as an objectively ‘optimal’ solution in any case
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994; Simon, 1983). Instead, making
intelligent choices about the tradeoffs inherent to economic
activity requires a pragmatic, adaptive approach. Society should
make decisions based on the best scientiﬁc evidence and partici-
patory, democratic discussion about available choices while fully
recognizing inherent uncertainty (Prugh et al., 2000). The scale of
the problem, which in the context of ecosystem services can
range from small watersheds to the global community, deter-
mines who should participate in decision-making. The imple-
mentation of each decision should be treated as a scientiﬁc
experiment that can help prove or disprove the underlying
hypotheses concerning nature, society and even the ethical values
that led to the decision. Decisions must also adapt to the
continuous inﬂux of new information about the complex ecolo-
gical-economic system (Norton, 2005).
The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the Ozone
layer provides a reasonable example of participatory adaptive
management at the global level: the treaty was signed when our
understanding of ozone depletion was very incomplete, it evolved
continuously as knowledge improved; and it had a dramatic
impact on a serious global problem (Norman et al., 2008). Brazil’s
forest code provides a potential example at the national scale.
Since the 1960s, when knowledge of ecosystem services was even
more rudimentary than today, the code has mandated forest
cover on a percentage of rural properties (varying with the
ecosystem) and in ecologically sensitive areas. Full compliance
would likely protect many key ecosystem services (Metzger,
2010). The code has been modiﬁed to meet the needs of small
farmers. Current efforts to modify the code in favor of agro-
industry however go strongly against public opinion (Datafolha,
2011), and have not been informed by science (Silva et al., 2011).
One serious debate within this framework is over the use of
the terms ecosystem services and natural capital, which many
critics consider equivalent to the commodiﬁcation of nature (e.g.
McCauley, 2006). It certainly is possible that these concepts
contribute to an over-emphasis on market solutions (Norgaard,
2010), but one goal of this article is to illustrate the usefulness of
the ecosystem service concept even when considering non-
market economic institutions.
That said, EEE does not rule out the use of monetary valuation,
green taxes, cap and auction schemes or payments for ecosystem
services in all cases. For example, restoring ecosystem services in
urban watersheds can dramatically reduce costs of water utilities
and storm water projects, and a monetary estimate of such
savings is an important facet of the value of ecosystem services.
In pragmatic terms, valuation can also help call attention to the
overall importance of ecosystem services. However, the recogni-
tion that only some facets of ecosystem service value can be
monetized means that we should be very wary of confusing these
partial values with exchange values (Kumar, 2010).
In many cases, non-monetary valuation may be preferable. A
valuation study for example might ﬁrst determine whether the
local ecosystem service in question is essential, which would
make it potentially critical. Water puriﬁcation for example is a
critical service. The study would next determine whether the
actual quantity of the resource available is abundant, meaning
that there is enough to satisfy all desired uses, economic andecological; scarce, meaning that competition exists for the
resource (i.e. for the service itself or the ecosystem structure that
provides it); or critical, meaning that competition is ﬁerce enough
that at least some individuals do not get enough to satisfy basic
needs, thus crossing physiological thresholds. It would also be
important to determine scarcity trends, based on both supply and
demand. Is the resource growing scarcer (decreasing supply and/
or rising demand), staying the same, or becoming less scarce?
Critical resources would be essentially invaluable. Economic
analysis should focus on the lowest cost approaches to restoring
the service, or on ways to provide substitutes for populations that
could not otherwise afford them. If resources are scarce and
becoming scarcer, society should focus on halting conversion by
capping the land use change or the extraction of ecosystem
structure. Prices of land and raw materials could then adjust to
these caps.
Both taxes and cap and auction schemes are fully compatible
with common ownership of our shared inheritance from nature,
as long as the revenue is dedicated to the common good (Barnes,
2006; Barnes et al., 2008). Taxes however are a liability rule and
cannot guarantee sustainability. Caps in contrast can be set at a
level that awards future generations and other species with
inalienable rights to a healthy, resilient ecosystem. Many people
are concerned that speculators will be able to manipulate the
market for tradable permits (Andrew, 2008); to prevent such
rent-seeking behavior, auctioned permits for throughput should
probably be temporary and non-tradable.
Concerning PES, there are real costs to preserving and restoring
ecosystem services, and it makes sense that the service beneﬁciaries
pay these costs. In many cases however the services themselves are
public goods, and public sector investments are required to promote
the land uses that protect them, such as agroecology (De Schutter,
2010; Farley et al., 2011). In such circumstances, PES might take the
form of public sector to public sector transfers (also known as
intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers; Kumar and Managi, 2009; Ring,
2008)). In other circumstances, cooperative investments in steward-
ship that share risk and stimulate reciprocity may be more appro-
priate than compensation conditional upon service provision (van
Noorwijk and Leimona, 2010).
Furthermore, PES schemes are likely to be very inefﬁcient for
non-rival resources, which are not depleted through use are not
scarce in the economic sense of the word, and should not be
rationed. Perhaps the only ecosystem service that ﬁts this
description is genetic information, to which the convention on
biodiversity created national property rights. The problems with
this approach are best illustrated with a case study. In 2007,
Indonesia discovered a new strain of avian ﬂu, which could
potentially have led to a global pandemic. The historic approach
to the discovery of such diseases was to give a sample to the
World Health Organization, then let whoever wished to do so
attempt to create a vaccine or cure. Typically, dozens of corpora-
tions might compete to ﬁnd a vaccine, with the ﬁrst one to do so
winning a patent. The patent would allow the corporation to
charge monopoly proﬁts on the vaccine, which would make it
unaffordable to the world’s poor. This would decrease the like-
lihood of achieving herd immunity, and hence increase the like-
lihood of a pandemic and evolution of the virus into new forms.
Recognizing this dynamic, Indonesia threatened to auction off the
virus to a single corporation (McNeil, 2007), presumably with the
understanding that the corporation would also provide Indonesia
with access to the vaccine at an affordable price. While Indone-
sia’s approach certainly made sense from a national perspective,
allowing only one corporation to seek a cure would presumably
reduce the likelihood of ﬁnding one.
Paradoxically, maximizing the economic surplus from genetic
information or of a vaccine requires charging a price of zero. The
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solving many environmental problems is also non-rival, and is
likely in fact to improve through use. Putting a price on such
resources however rations access to those who can afford to pay,
reducing societal beneﬁts from additional use without reducing
societal costs. There is in fact no efﬁcient market solution for the
allocation of non-rival resources (Kubiszewski et al., 2010).
In summary, advocates of EEE believe that ecological sustain-
ability and just distribution cannot be achieved through market
mechanisms, and both are prerequisites for efﬁcient allocation.
Humans and all other species rely for their survival on ecosystem
services, which mean that economic institutions must ensure
both their sustainable provision and just distribution.5. Conclusions
The concept of ecosystem services is extremely valuable when
deciding how to allocate the resources provided by nature among
alternative desirable ends, whether or not the end receiving
highest priority is monetary value, quality of life, or the preserva-
tion of nature for its intrinsic values. Many conventional econo-
mists do use the concept of ecosystem services in their efforts to
commodify nature, but this is a function of the discipline, not the
concept. Ecological economists and others use the concept of
ecosystem services to illustrate why market allocation fails to
achieve ecological sustainability or just distribution. Most eco-
system services cannot and should not be integrated into the
market framework. Instead, alternative economic institutions
must ensure ecological sustainability and the just distribution of
resources before markets can possibly be efﬁcient, and even then
market efﬁciency cannot be taken for granted.
Economic analysis of ecosystem services generally begins with
implicit assumptions about the nature of sustainability, the
deﬁnition of justice, and the values that should be maximized.
The main conclusion of this paper is that these underlying
assumptions must be made explicit as the starting point in any
economic analysis. While the debates over sustainability may one
day be resolved by science, until then the debate inevitably has a
normative component concerning the treatment of uncertainty
and acceptable risks to future generations. The debate over just
distribution will always be normative. Though many economists
claim that Pareto efﬁciency is a value neutral, objective decision
rule, it is perhaps the most value-laden of the debates discussed
here despite its mathematical framework. As a social science,
economic analysis of ecosystem services must be based on
normative values, and can only aspire to any level of scientiﬁc
objectivity if it makes those values explicit.References
AAH, 2009. Feeding Hunger and Insecurity. The Global Food Price Crisis—A
Summary of AAH Research in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic
and Liberia. Brieﬁng Paper—January 2009. Available from: /http://www.
aahuk.org/documents/Jan2009-FeedingHungerandInsecurity-HQ.pdfS.
Ackerman, F., Heinzerling, L., 2004. Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything
and the Value of Nothing. The New Press, New York.
Andrew, Brian, 2008. Market failure, government failure and externalities in
climate change mitigation: the case for a carbon tax. Public Administration
and Development 28 (5), 393–401.
Barnes, Peter, 2006. Capitalism 3.0. A Guide to Reclaiming the Commons. Berrett-
Koehler Publishers, San Francisco.
Barnes, Peter, et al., 2008. Creating an Earth Atmospheric Trust. Science 319
(5864), 724b.
Battisti, David S., Naylor, Rosamond L., 2009. Historical warnings of future food
insecurity with unprecedented seasonal heat. Science 323 (5911), 240–244.
Blockstein, David E., 1998. Lyme disease and the Passenger Pigeon? Science 279
(5358), 1831.
Brundtland, et al., 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Cl o, Stefano, 2010. Grandfathering, auctioning and carbon leakage: assessing the
inconsistencies of the new ETS directive. Energy Policy 38 (5), 2420–2430.
Coase, R., 1988. The Firm, the Market and the Law. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Costanza, R., Daly, H.E., Bartholomew, J.A., 1991. Goals, agenda, and policy
recommendations for ecological economics. In: Costanza, R. (Ed.), Ecological
Economics: The Science and Management Of Sustainability. Columbia Uni-
versity Press, New York, pp. 1–20.
Costanza, R., et al., 1997a. The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural
capital. Nature 387, 253–260.
Costanza, Robert, et al., 1997b. An Introduction to Ecological Economics. Interna-
tional Society for Ecological Economics and St. Lucie Press, Boca Raton, Florida.
Costanza, Robert, et al., 2007. Quality of life: an approach integrating opportunities,
human needs, and subjective well-being. Ecological Economics 61 (2–3),
267–276.
Crutzen, P., 2002. Geology of mankind. Nature 415, 23.
Curtsdotter, Alva, et al., 2011. Robustness to secondary extinctions: comparing
trait-based sequential deletions in static and dynamic food webs. Basic and
Applied Ecology 12 (7), 571–580.
Daily, Gretchen C., Ellison, Katherine, 2002. The New Economy of Nature: The
Quest to Make Conservation Proﬁtable. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Daly, H.E., 1990. Towards some operational principles for sustainable develop-
ment. Ecological Economics 2, 1–6.
Daly, Herman, 2007. Ecological economics and sustainable development, selected
essays of Herman Daly. In: Jeroen, C.J.M, van den, Bergh (Eds.), Advances in
Ecological Economics. Edward Elgar, Northampton,MA.
Daly, Herman, 1977. Steady-State Economics: The Political Economy of Bio-
physical Equilibrium and Moral Growth. W.H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco.
Daly, Herman, Farley, Joshua, 2010. Ecological Economics: Principles and Applica-
tions: 2nd edition, 1st ed. Island Press, Washington, DC, p. 450.
Dasgupta, P.S., Heal, G.M., 1979. Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Dasgupta, Partha, 2008. Nature in economics. Environmental and Resource
Economics 39, 1–7.
Datafolha, 2011. Codigo Florestal (Survey conducted May, 2011, published June 10,
2011), Sao Paulo. /http://icv.institucional.ws/w/library/50999apresentacao_
codigo_ﬂorestal_pesquisa_datafolhap.ptxS.
De Schutter, Olivier, 2010. Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food. United Nations Human Right Council, NY.
Diamandis, Peter, Kotler, Stephen, 2012. Abundance: The Future is Brighter Than
you Think. Free Press, New York.
Ekins, Paul, Folke, Carl, De Groot, Rudolf, 2003a. Identifying critical natural capital.
Ecological Economics 44 (2–3), 159–163.
Ekins, Paul, et al., 2003b. A framework for the practical application of the concepts
of critical natural capital and strong sustainability. Ecological Economics 44
(2–3), 165–185.
Engel, Stefanie, Pagiola, Stefano, Wunder, Sven, 2008. Designing payments for
environmental services in theory and practice: an overview of the issues.
Ecological Economics 65 (4), 663–674.
Farley, Joshua, 2008a. Environmental valuation and its application. In: Faleiro, F.G.,
Farias Neto, A.L. (Eds.), Savanas: Desaﬁos e estrate´gias para o equilı´brio entre
sociedade, agronego´cio e recursos naturais. Embrapa Cerrados, Planaltina, DF.
Farley, Joshua, 2008b. The role of prices in conserving critical natural capital.
Conservation Biology 22 (6), 1399–1408.
Farley, Joshua, 2010. Conservation through the economics lens. Environmental
Management 45 (1), 26–38.
Farley, Joshua, Costanza, Robert, 2010. Payments for ecosystem services: from
local to global. Ecological Economics 69 (11), 2060–2068.
Farley, Joshua, et al., 2011. How valuing nature can transform agriculture.
Solutions 2 (6), 64–73.
Firth, Penny, Blockstein, David. Passenger Pigeons: nomads lost. AAAS Science
NetLinks, no date. /http://sciencenetlinks.com/lessons/passenger-pigeons-no
mads-lost/S.
Fisher, Brendan, et al., 2008. Ecosystem services and economic theory: integration
for policy-relevant research. Ecological Applications 18 (8), 2050–2067.
Funtowicz, Silvio O., Ravetz, Jerome R., 1994. The worth of a songbird: ecological
economics as a post-normal science. Ecological Economics 10 (3), 197–207.
Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas, 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Getzner, Spash, Michael, Clive, Stagl, Sigrid, 2005. Alternatives for Environmental
Valuation.
Gneezy, Uri, Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. Pay enough Or don’t pay at all. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115 (3), 791–810.
Gustavsson, Jenny, et al., 2011. Global Food Losses and Food Waste: Exent, Causes
and Prevention. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Rome.
Hardin, Garrett, 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243–1248.
International Energy Agency, 2011. 2011 Key World Energy Statistics. Interna-
tional Energy Agency, Paris, France.
IPCC, 2007a. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Con-
tribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
IPCC, 2007b. Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
J. Farley / Ecosystem Services 1 (2012) 40–49 49IPCC, 2007c. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Kahn, James Randall, Franceschi, Dina, 2006. Beyond Kyoto: a tax-based system for
the global reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Ecological Economics 58 (4),
778–787.
Kauffman, Stuart A., 1995. At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-
organization and Complexity. Oxford University Press, US, New York.
Kubiszewski, Ida, Farley, Joshua, Costanza, Robert, 2010. The production and
allocation of information as a good that is enhanced with increased use.
Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1344–1354.
Kumar, Pushpam (Ed.), 2010. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity:
Ecological and Economic Foundations. Earthscan, London and Washington.
Kumar, Surender, Managi, Shunsuke, 2009. Compensation for environmental
services and intergovernmental ﬁscal transfers: the case of India. Ecological
Economics 68 (12), 3052–3059.
Lagi, M., et al., 2012. UPDATE February 2012—The Food Crises: Predictive
Validation of a Quantitative Model of Food Prices Including Speculators and
Ethanol Conversion. arXiv:1203.1313 (accessed 06.03.12).
Lemus, Jesu´s A., Blanco, Guillermo, 2009. Cellular and humoral immunodepression
in vultures feeding upon medicated livestock carrion. Proceedings of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences 276 (1665), 2307–2313.
Leopold, Aldo, 1993. Round River. Oxford University Press, New York.
Liu, Jianguo, et al., 2007. Complexity of coupled human and natural systems.
Science 317 (5844), 1513–1516.
Malghan, Deepak, 2011. A dimensionally consistent aggregation framework for
biophysical metrics. Ecological Economics 70, 900–909.
Markandya, Anil, et al., 2008. Counting the cost of vulture decline—an appraisal of
the human health and other beneﬁts of vultures in India. Ecological Economics
67 (2), 194–204.
McCauley, Douglas J., 2006. Selling out on nature. Nature 443 (7107), 27–28.
McNeil, Jr., Donald, G., 2007. Indonesia May Sell, Not Give, Bird Flu Virus to
Scientists. New York Times.
Meadows, D.H., Randers, J., Meadows, D.L., 2004. Limits to Growth: The 30-Year
Update. Chelsea Green, White River Junction, Vermont.
Meadows, Donella, 2008. Thinking in Systems: A Primer. Chelsea Green, White
River Junction. VT.
Metzger, J.P., 2010. O Co´digo Florestal tem base cientı´ﬁca? Conservac- ~ao e Natureza
8 (1), 92–99.
Mill, J.S., 1871. Utilitarianism, fourth edition Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer,
London.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being:
Synthesis. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Muradian, Roldan, 2001. Ecological thresholds: a survey. Ecological Economics 38
(1), 7–24.
Muradian, Roldan, et al., 2010. Reconciling theory and practice: an alternative
conceptual framework for understanding payments for environmental ser-
vices. Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1202–1208.
Napolitano, Sam, et al., 2007. The US acid rain program: key insights from the
design, operation, and assessment of a cap-and-trade program. The Electricity
Journal 20 (7), 47–58.
Neumayer, Eric, 2003. Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of
Two Opposing Paradigms. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.Norgaard, Richard B., 2010. Ecosystem services: from eye-opening metaphor to
complexity blinder. Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1219–1227.
Norman, Catherine, DeCanio, Stephen, Fan, Lin, 2008. The Montreal Protocol at 20:
ongoing opportunities for integration with climate protection. Global Envir-
onmental Change 18 (2), 330–340.
Norton, Bryan G., 2005. Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Management.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Pearce, D.W., Turner, R.K., 1990. Economics of Natural Resources and the
Environment. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire England.
Porras, Ina, Grieg-Gran, Maryanne, Neves, Nanete, 2008. All that glitters: A review
of payments for watershed services in developing countries. The International
Institute for Environment and Development, London.
Profﬁtt, Fiona, Bagla, Pallava, 2004. Circling in on a vulture killer. Science 306
(5694), 223.
Prugh, Thomas, Costanza, Robert, Daly, Herman, 2000. The Local Politics of Global
Sustainability. Island Press, Washington, DC.
Rawls, John (1999), A Theory of Justice (revised edition) (Boston MA: Harvard
University Press).
RGGI Inc., 2011. Investment of Proceeds from RGGI CO2 Allowances. Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Available from: /http://www.rggi.org/docs/Invest
ment_of_RGGI_Allowance_Proceeds.pdfS.
Ring, Irene, 2008. Integrating local ecological services into intergovernmental
ﬁscal transfers: the case of the ecological ICMS in Brazil. Land Use Policy 25,
485–497.
Rockstrom, Johan, et al., 2009. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature 461
(7263), 472–475.
Ronald, Coase, 1960. The Problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics
3 (1), 1–44.
Schelling, Thomas C., 2007. Greenhouse Effect. Liberty Fund, Inc /http://www.
econlib.org/library/Enc/GreenhouseEffect.htmlS.
Sierra, R., Russman, E., 2006. On the efﬁciency of environmental service payments:
a forest conservation assessment in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica. Ecological
Economics 59 (1), 131–141.
Silva, J.A.A., et al., 2011. O Co´digo Florestal e a Cieˆncia. Sociedade Brasileira para o
Progresso da Ciencia, SPBC; Academia Brasileira de Ciencias, Sao Paulo.
Simon, Herbert, 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford University Press,
Stanford.
Simon, Julian, 1996. The Ultimate Resource 2. Princeton University Press.
van Noorwijk, Meine, Leimona, Beria, 2010. CES/COS/CIS Paradigms for Compen-
sation and Rewards to Enhance Environmental Services. Working Paper no.
100. World Agroforestry Centre, Bogor, Indonesia.
Vatn, Arild, 2010. An institutional analysis of payments for environmental
services. Ecological Economics 69 (6), 1245–1252.
Wilkinson, Richard, Pickett, Kate, 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality
Makes Societies Stronger. Bloomsbury Press, New York.
Worm, Boris, et al., 2006. Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services.
Science 314 (5800), 787–790.
Wunder, Sven, 2005. Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts.
Occasional Paper no. 42. Center for International Forestry Research, Nairobi,
Kenya.
Wunder, Sven, Engel, Stefanie, Pagiola, Stefano, 2008. Taking stock: a comparative
analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and
developing countries. Ecological Economics 65 (4), 834–852.
